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C O N F I D E N T I A L THE HAGUE 000623

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SUBJECT: NETHERLANDS/IRAN: SANCTIONS AND ENGAGEMENT

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Classified By: Political Economic Counselor Andrew C. Mann for reasons
1.5(b,d)

11. (C) SUMMARY: The Dutch expect an insufficient Iranian response to the P5 1 proposal and the international community will need to move forward with additional multilateral sanctions. The Dutch continue to engage Iran on human rights despite strong differences of opinion within the Dutch government. The Dutch support expanded U.S. engagement with Iran, in formal and informal settings. END SUMMARY.

12. (C) SUPPORTING SANCTIONS: On July 22, Political Economic Counselor reviewed Iran issues with Dutch MFA officials Herman Quarles, head of the Gulf State division, Loek ten Hagen, Iran desk, and Huib Mijnaerends, terrorism and new threats division. Quarles was not optimistic that Iran would respond positively to the latest P5 1 package, and the Dutch support preparations for additional sanctions. Iran's written response was "not encouraging," did "not respond to the urgency" of the international community, and appeared "to continue with delay tactics." (Note: Quarles noted wryly that he had just received the "secret" Iran message handed to the P5 1 representatives in Geneva but had also read excerpts in the International Herald Tribune. End note.) FM Verhagen continues to support a robust response, but within the Netherlands that's not always easy, as his "strong approach meets 'nuances' from other ministries." At the EU, the Dutch are hoping for "contingency" work on sanctions in case the Iranians do not respond favorably. However, the EU will only receive a briefing from High Representative Solana at the July 22-23 GAERC, with no recommendation for possible next steps. Regarding EU negotiations to implement UNSC resolution 1803, there is a "gap" on export credit financing, with some countries opposed to going beyond UNSC 1803. Dual use issues appear to be addressed. The Dutch are proposing an alternative to an EU "Financial Intelligence Unit," which is supported by some countries. At the IAEA, the Dutch were disappointed the Board of Governors (BoG) did not adopt a resolution based on DG El Baradei's last report. The Dutch support a resolution at the next BoG meeting. At the UN, the Dutch would welcome details on U.S. planning for the next sanctions resolution.

13. (C) PROMOTING HUMAN RIGHTS: Quarles noted that addressing human rights in Iran remains a priority for the Netherlands. The Dutch see working through the EU as most effective. They do have their bilateral issues/programs though. The Dutch expect Iranian-Dutch national Al Mansouri to receive the death penalty. The Dutch have not received further updates since the Iranians told them months ago that Al Mansouri's sentence was "imminent," but they expect the "Iranian authorities will use this case in a tactical sense" whenever they can. At the same time, Iranian FM Mottaki's wife, who serves as a director general-level adviser on human rights and women's issues, is considering a Dutch invitation to visit the Netherlands. The Dutch support media diversity in

Iran through its human rights program, with a total of 4-5 million euros annually. The Dutch have also supported training for Iranian judges.

14. (C) SUPPORTING U.S.-IRAN DISCUSSIONS: The Dutch support formal and informal engagement with Iran by the United States. Quarles described U/S Burns' participation in the Geneva Iran-P5 1 meeting as a "very positive development." Dutch contacts with Germany, France and Britain all reported that Iranian FM Mottaki "reacted with great surprise" to Secretary Rice's signature on the P5 1 letter. In Quarles' view, adding a U.S. participant to the meetings in Tehran would have had an "exponentially greater impact." On an informal level, there will be another Pugwash meeting in The Hague on August 2-3 (tentative dates). The Dutch readout of the previous meeting was that "little was accomplished," but the Dutch support such meetings that are "out of the spotlight." The Iranian ambassador in the Netherlands told the Dutch MFA he will invite: Mr. Samareh Hashemi, Senior Advisor to the President, Mr. Safari, Deputy Foreign Minister for European Affairs, Mr. Bagheri, Deputy Secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council, Mr. Dolatyr, DG for Western Europe at the MFA, and Mr. Saeedi, deputy president of Iran's atomic energy organization. Ten Hagen wasn't sure the list was realistic given the short time frame. More generally, Dutch MFA Political Director De Gooijer told the Iranian ambassador that the Dutch could support bilateral meetings between Iranian and American legislators in the Netherlands.
Gallagher